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 The Malaysian Constitution is in a sense unique because it was born during a state of 
Emergency on 31st August 1957, a consequence of the communist insurgency that 
lasted from 1948 to 1960. The British ruled Malaya from 1948 - 1957 under an 
emergency proclamation issued on 13 July 1948. This proclamation continued 
through independence and was ended only on 29 July 1960. 
 
Consequently the usual constitutional guarantees in respect of fundamental liberties 
that one would normally expect in a constitution of an independent nation came to be 
subject to the overhanging dark cloud of special emergency powers and powers 
against subversion. Since independence, these special powers have in fact become 
tighter and wider in scope arising from a series of constitutional amendments. These 
have had the effect of curtailing fundamental liberties and human rights according to 
international standards. 
 
 Article 150 - Emergency (Overlapping Emergencies) 
 In fact for the major part of its post-independence period, the nation has existed under 
a continuous state of Emergency except for the period 1960 to 1964. More curiously, 
the nation now exists under four overlapping Proclamations of Emergency. 
 
 The first of the currently subsisting proclamation was made on 3 September 1964   
due to the confrontation with Indonesia; the second on 14 September 1966 in the state 
of Sarawak to deal with the political crisis that arose from the efforts of the federal 
government to replace the Chief Minister of Sarawak; the third on 15 May 1969 due 
to racial riots; and the fourth on 8 November 1977 in the state of Kelantan, again to 
deal with a political crisis caused by the effort of the party in power at the federal 
level to impose on the state a Chief Minister of its own choice. 
 
 Article 150(2) of the Constitution brought about by an amendment in 1981 confers 
upon the Yang di Pertuan Agong: 
“the power to issue different Proclamations on different grounds or in different 
circumstances, whether or not there is a Proclamation or Proclamations already 
issued ... and such Proclamation or Proclamations are in operation”. 
 
 Two or more proclamations may therefore validly overlap. It is necessary for 
Parliament to specifically annul a Proclamation of Emergency and till then the state of 
Emergency would subsist and the laws promulgated under it would continue to apply. 
 
 In the first Report by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (“SUHAKAM”) to 
Parliament, the Commission expressed its serious concern that none of these four 
proclamations have been revoked resulting in a “perpetual state of emergency” which 
“enables the Government to promulgate emergency regulations even though both 
Houses of Parliament are sitting and the events that occasioned the states of 
emergency had come to pass”. ¹ 
 
 The emergency  regulations  which  are still  invoked  and  applied are the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance 1969; the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975 
(ESCAR) and the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979. These undoubtedly 
constitute a blot on our system of parliamentary democracy.  
 
 Article 149 - Special Powers Against Subversion 
 The  Article 149 Special Powers Against Subversion permit the violation of 
fundamental rights contained in Articles 5 (relating to personal liberty), 9 (relating to 
prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement), 10 (relating to  freedom of 
speech, assembly and association) and 13 (relating to rights of property).  
 
 These powers which curtail fundamental liberties are triggered by the simple 
expedient of a magical incantation in the form of a “recital” in an Act of Parliament 
that “action has been taken or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether 
within or outside the federation” to cause fear of subversion. ² 
 
 “Subversion” has  been  defined  in  Article  149 (1) to refer to the following : causing 
people to fear organised violence; exciting disaffection against the government; 
promoting feelings of ill-will between classes of the population in such a way as is 
likely to cause violence; procuring alteration, otherwise than by lawful means of 
anything by law established; prejudicing the maintenance of any supply or service to 
the public; or causing prejudice to public order or national security. 
 
 It is evident that this definition of subversion “is of such a broad, catch - all nature 
that even vigorous criticism of official polices, industrial action like strikes and call to 
taxpayers to withhold payment could conceivably fall within the parimeters of 
subversion. Only the good sense of those in power is a safeguard against overzealous 
use of the law’s omnipotence”. ³ 
 
It is Article 149 which is the parent of preventive detention laws such as the  Internal 
Security Act 1960 (ISA) and the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 
1985. The other law which provides for preventive detention is The Emergency 
(Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969. This paper will deal 
specifically with the ISA.  
 
The Internal Security Act 1960 (“ISA”) 
Under this law the Minister of Home Affairs may detain a person for a period not 
exceeding two years (and renewable for two year periods indefinitely) on the 
suspicion or belief that the detention of that person is necessary in the interest of 
public order or security.  Further no grounds need be given by the Minister for the 
initial order or the extension.4  It is significant to note that in law this is an executive 
detention order and not a detention pursuant to a judicial decision.  
 
This  is underscored  by  the  highest  judiciary  in the land  which pronounced 
 “the ISA is a peculiar law, and is peculiar to our country” and further that the 
“judges in the matter of preventive detention relating to the security of the Federation  
are the executive” .  
 
This judicial abdication was pronounced in the hallmark case of  Theresa Lim Chin 
Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police (1988) 1 MLJ 293.  The appellants were 
detained in a police crack-down code-named “Operation Lalang” and were among the 
106 citizens including the leader of the Opposition, Members of Parliament, civil-
society advocates, academicians, social workers and religious leaders who were put 
away by executive action in one of the largest and widest ISA swoops in independent  
Malaysia, marking one of the darkest episodes in the chapter of human  rights abuses 
in the country. 
 
This case gave life to the ghost  of Liversidge v Anderson (1942) A.C 206 and  
affirmed that it is not the function of the court to review the discretionary  executive 
decision and the grounds upon which they came to the belief that it was necessary or 
desirable to hold a person in detention for national security.  
 
In fact the court extended the haunt of the ghost from the Ministerial detention order 
under section 85 to the initial police power of arrest and detention under section 736. It 
held that both the initial police arrest and detention “pending enquiries” and the final 
ministerial detention could not be separated. Its reasons may be summarized by 
referring to this passage in the judgment : 
 
“ Looking at the provision relating to preventive detention, we cannot see how the 
police power of arrest and detention under s.73 could be separated from the 
ministerial power to issue an order of detention under s.8. We are of opinion that 
there is only one preventive detention and that is based on the order to be made by the 
Minister under s.8. However, the Minister will not be in a position to make that order, 
unless information and evidence are brought before him, and, for this purpose, the 
police is entrusted by the Act to carry out the necessary investigation and, pending 
inquiries, to arrest and detain a person, in respect of whom the police have reason to 
believe that there exists grounds which would justify the detention of such person 
under s.8. There can be no running away from the fact that the police power under 
s.73 is a step towards the ministerial power of issuing an order of detention unders 
s.8, which the Attorney - General referred to as the initial stage in the process leading 
to preventive detention.”   
 
Before  we discuss some of the consequences of allowing the  executive  
to be the judge of national security without judicial supervision, we will consider the 
scheme of detention under the ISA. 
 
 Detention Pending Enquiries 
The first stage is a detention pending enquiries by the police under section 73. This 
usually lasts for 60 days which is the maximum period permissible under  that  
section.  During  that  time  the detainees are housed in gazetted  
 
cells and denied access to lawyers and family members for such period as the police 
deem  fit. 
 
The Right To Counsel 
In Theresa Lim, the Supreme Court asked itself the question : “ When  should a 
detainee arrested under section 73 of the Internal Security Act be allowed to exercise  
his right under Article 5(3) of the Constitution to consult a counsel of his choice ? 
The court answered characteriscally : “.. The matter should best be left to the good 
judgment of the authority as and when such right might not interfere with police 
investigation”. 
 
This issue has visited the courts again when in another recent crackdown, the police 
arrested and detained seven refomasi activists under S73(1) of the ISA. This time 
there were two conflicting decisions of the High Court. 
 
In Mohamad Ezam v Inspector General of Police (2001) 2 MLJ 481, 
the court found itself bound by the Theresa Lim case and dismissed the 
applicant’s habeas corpus motion on the grounds inter alia that police 
action in denying the applicant legal access was in accordance with law 
and the test to determine the validity of detention was subjective both 
for the initial police detention and the subsequent ministerial order. This  
case went on appeal to the  Federal  Court .  
 
In Abdul Ghani Hassan v Ketua Polis Negara (2001) 2 MLJ 689, the 
Learned Judge declined to abdicate. He held that : “...Since the day of 
arrest, the lawyers engaged by the families, have been denied access. 
Such a denial is not only cruel, inhuman and oppressive, it is also a 
blatant violation of the applicants’ constitutional rights under art 5(3) 
of the Constitution which stipulates: 
Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may 
be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult 
and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice....  
 
 ....Now, if the applicants truly believe that they have done no wrong at all, and that 
from their standpoint they have been framed or persecuted, how are they to present 
their case in   the best possible manner if they are not allowed access to counsel? This 
denial to counsel is not only unjust : it also makes a mockery of the right to apply for 
habeas corpus as guaranteed by art. 5(2) of the Constitution”. 
 
This is formidable reasoning and resounding justice. Unfortunately, the  Federal Court 
in the Mohammed Ezam case has recently decided in its judgment on 6th September 
2002 that the test propounded by the Theresa Lim Case, ie the “good judgment of the 
authority as and when such rights might not intefere with police investigation” would 
apply. The Federal Court did however say that “to stretch that denial througout the 
duration of the sixty day period makes a mockery of Article 5(3)” but again went on to 
say that “A complaint by a person while under lawful detention that he has been 
refused access to counsel... will not have the effect of rendering his detention 
unlawful...”7 To say the least, the current position appears to be one of confusion. Are 
the police obliged to give the detainees the right to legal counsel on the 2nd or 59th day 
and if access is denied throughout what happens ? Nothing. The detention remains 
lawful. 
 
Right Of Detainees To Be Present During Habeas Corpus Hearing 
Another burning issue is whether detainees have the right to be present at the hearing 
of their habeas corpus motions. The Learned Judge in the Abdul Ghani Case ruled that 
by virtue of cl (2) of art 5 of the Federal Constitution, the right to apply to the High 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus was not merely a legal right, but also a constitutional 
right available to any person who believes that he has been unlawfully detained. Since 
the right is a constitutional right, he has every right to be present in court at the 
hearing of his application.8 
 
However in the morning of that day, before the applicants could be produced, the 
Attorney General sought for and obtained a stay from the Federal Court of  the ‘notice 
to produce’ the applicants. The Federal Court subsequently reversed the Learned 
Judge’s ruling on the primary argument that “As the proceedings are to be by way of 
affidavit evidence, it implies, therefore that there would be no legal right for a 
detained person to be produced at the hearing of the habeas corpus proceeding .... In 
other words, no  oral  evidence is required in the habeas corpus proceeding and the 
issue of the detainee being prejudiced would not arise. He had the benefit of counsel”. 
9 
 
One may ask of what benefit can counsel be if they are denied access to their client 
and have to take instructions only from the family members, who themselves are 
denied access ! 
 
Importance Of Affidavits By Detainees 
In fact in the Mohamad Ezam case which went on appeal to the Federal Court, (by 
which time the detainees were no longer under police custody as the Minister had 
ordered them to be detained under section 8 of the ISA) the detainees applied for and 
obtained leave to file Affidavits which were not available in the High Court because 
access to Counsel was denied.  Upon leave being granted they filed Affidavits which 
disclosed that police investigations and interrogration during the 60 day detention had 
nothing to do with national security. 
 
They were on :10 
(a) political views 
(b) involvement in creating turmoil/ disturbances 
(C) Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim sexual activities 
(d) opposition parties and their leaders  
(e)     sexual allegation  
(f) street demonstration 
(g) Lunas by - elections 
(e) source of funding of Keadilan 
 
Based on their new Affidavits filed in the Federal Court the court held that the arrest 
and detention by the police was mala fide in that it was “not for the dominant purpose 
of s.73 ie. to enable the police to conduct further investigation regarding the 
appellant’s acts and conduct which are prejudicial to the security of Malaysia , but 
merely for intelligence gathering which is unconnected with national security”. ¹¹ 
 
The Federal Court thereupon issued the writ of habeas corpus for the appellants to be 
set at liberty and be released. 
 
Academic Habeas Corpus 
Then came the bombshell. The Federal Court ruled that because the habeas corpus was 
issued in respect of the police arrest and detention under s.73 and the detainees were 
currently detained pursuant to the Ministerial Order under s.8, they could not be set 
free. Counsel were advised to file for a fresh habeas corpus motion in respect of the 
Ministerial Order of two year detention. 
 
This decision has sparked outrage in civil society and in legal circles. The argument is 
that   the Theresa Lim formulation of the inextricable link between s.73 and s.8 would 
mean that the ministerial order being the  fruit of the poisonous tree is contaminated 
and the continued detention must be bad in law. 
 
However the Federal Court in Mohd Ezam held that “although s.73(1) and s.8 are 
connected, they can nevertheless operate quite independently of each other under 
certain circumstances. Section 8 is not necessarily dependent on s.73(1) and vice 
versa. In the circumstances, it cannot therefore be that they are inextricably 
connected”.¹² By that logic, the detainees remain in detention under the ISA although 
their arrest and detention under the Act has been held to be mala fide and an abuse and 
misuse of the Act !   
 
The Ministerial s.8 Order 
The second stage of detention under section 8 relating to the ministerial  order is 
subject to s.8 B(1) of the ISA which deals with the ouster of the jurisdiction of the 
courts. It reads :  
 
“There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise 
any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with 
this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural 
requirement in this Act governing such act or decision”. 
 
Hence we are back to  Liversidge v Anderson and the subjective satisfaction of the 
Minister who needs give no grounds. 
 
The Advisory Board 
The third stage provides for representations to the Advisory Board against the 
detention order pursuant to section 11. Section 12 and 13 provide respectively that the 
Advisory Board shall make their recommendation to the Yang di Pertuan  Agong and 
that the Advisory Board shall conduct a review of the detention at least once every 6 
months. Section 14 provides that the Advisory Board shall subject to Section 16 have 
all the powers of a court for summoning and examination of witnesses and production 
of witnesses. 
 
However Section 16 provides that : “Nothing in this Chapter or in any rules made 
thereunder shall require the Minister or any member of an Advisory Board or any 
public servant to disclose facts or to produce documents which he considers it to be 
against the national interest to disclose or produce”. 
 
Abuse of the ISA       
The history of the ISA is replete with abuse and misuse and questions have been 
raised whether the ISA is  a shield against terrorism or is in fact an instrument of 
oppression. The Parliamentary debates in the Dewan Rakyat in June 1960 reflect that 
the ISA was enacted for the sole purpose of fighting the communist insurgency and it 
was intended as a temporary measure until that threat was removed. In fact that threat 
has been removed since the Malaysian Communist Party laid down its arms and gave 
up its struggle officially after the signing of the Bangkok Accord on 24 December 
1989. 
 
It is a notorious fact that the ISA has been invoked and applied to circumstances and 
occasions not contemplated when the statute was enacted. 
 
For example in the recent past the ISA has been invoked or threatened to be invoked 
in respect of those alleged to have spread rumours, forged passports, cloned hand 
phones, breached copyrights, counterfeited coins and documents. There is significant 
body of public opinion that the ISA has persistently been used to stifle legitimate 
opposition and silence lawful dissent. ¹³ 
 
 
One grotesque example of its abuse can be seen in the case of Dr. Munawar Aness 
who was arrested under the ISA in 1998 ostensibly for matters relating to national 
security but was then speedily charged for an offence under section 377D of  the Penal 
Code for gross indecency, leaving the public stunned and puzzled as to how an alleged 
act of sodomy can be seen as a matter of national security  to justify an arrest under 
the ISA. 14 
 
Another instance of abuse was the case of Anwar the former Deputy Prime Minister. 
He was arrested in his home on 20th September 1998 by the Police Special Task Force 
with balaclava and an armoury of fire - power as if they were storming a  terrorist  
fortress. He was not initially arrested under the ISA but his detention was 
subsequently converted into an ISA detention in the middle of the night, which meant 
that the police did not have to produce him before the Magistrate the next morning as 
stipulated in Article 5(4) of the Constitution. It is now public knowledge that in fact in 
the middle of the night he lay in his cell bloodied and bludgeoned by the hand of the 
Chief of Police. We have to question whether in this instance the ISA was actually 
invoked as an instrument of state terror to cover up a crime perpetrated by the Chief of 
Police. 15 
 
We also cannot ignore the very credible first party accounts of the brutal manner in 
which the ISA has been used as an instrument of torture. One only has to refer to the 
Affidavit of Yeshua Jamaluddin filed for his habeas corpus  hearing in October 
1988,16 the shocking disclosure in Parliament in March 1989 by the former Sarawak 
State Assemblyman Abdul Rahman Hamzah17 and the more recent Affidavit by Dr. 
Munawar Anees in 1998,18 to name only some examples.  Any honest and objective 
inquiry into the ISA cannot simply ignore these travesties and inhumanities committed 
in the name of national security. Recent attempts by the executive to justify the 
continued use of this unjust law as a shield against “terrorism” are less than 
convincing considering that in recent history the ISA has been seen by a large cross 
section of society as an instrument state terror. 
 
The position taken by civil society groups and a significant cross-section of Malaysian  
society is that the ISA is a draconian and obnoxious law which undermines the rule of 
law and fundamental principles of human rights. Given its history of oppression and 
injustice perpetrated in its name, nothing short of a repeal will satisfy the cause of 
human rights and the rule of law. 
 
Recommendations 
Preventive Detention Laws are a challenge to the rule of law and the Judiciary has a 
crucial role in softening the effect of these restrictive laws  through interpretation and 
application of the principles of justice and equity. 19 The latest Federal Court decision 
of Mohamad Ezam has ameliorated to some extent the hands-off approach of Theresa 
Lim but the issuance of the academic habeas corpus with no judicial bite has serious 
consequences on the role of the courts in protecting and upholding the rule of law.  It 
may be perceived as a signal to the executive that the court’s pronouncements in 
respect of security laws can safely be ignored, thus undermining the judiciary’s 
perceived status as the ultimate defender of fundamental liberties and human rights 
against the excesses of the executive.  
 
In fact Justice In Jeapordy : Malaysia 2000, a report of a mission by legal and judicial 
luminaries concluded that the danger to the rule of law in Malaysia “appears to lie in 
the actions of the various branches of an extremely  powerful executive, which has not 
acted with due regard for the other essential elements of a free and democratic society 
based on the just rule of law. Such due regard requires both a clear grasp of the 
concept of the separation of powers and also an element of restraint by all branches of 
the executive.  These  have  not  always  been  evident”. 20 It concluded that the 
judiciary should play its role in checking the demands of executive power with 
fundamental liberties and human rights. 
 
The report recommended that : 
(1) the proclamations of emergency should be revoked  or annulled under the 
provisions of Article 150(3) of the Constitution;  
(2) Article 149 of the Constitution should be repealed; 
(3) The ISA and other preventive detention laws should be repealed and rights of 
due process guaranteed. 
 
Aftermath of September 11 
The September 11 terrorist attack on the US has provided a new impetus to the use of 
the ISA in cracking down on alleged terrorist and militant actions in Malaysia.²¹ 
 
Sixty three (63) suspected Islamic militants described as members of the Malaysia 
Militant Group (KMM) with the alleged object of waging war to overthrow the 
government by violent means have been recently detained under the ISA. On 
28.9.2002, the Police announced they were looking for at least 8 more leaders of the 
KMM. The KMM is alleged to have links with the Singapore based Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) which is accused of plotting attacks on western targets in Singapore. JI in turn is 
believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group, blamed for the September 
11 attacks. 
 
The Singapore Government, in the week before, announced the arrest of 21 suspected 
terrorists, 19 of them allegedly JI members, including some who had allegedly 
undergone military training at the al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. 
 
The government announced that these suspected terrorists were planning to cripple 
military and other strategic targets as part of a plan to overthrow the Malaysian 
government and create an Islamic State. This was alleged to be the first step towards 
their ultimate goal of an Islamic State in Singapore, the southern Philippines island of 
Mindanao and Brunei. 
 
In the context of the aftermath of September 11, the question is whether preventive 
detention is a necessary evil in our laws to protect democracy. The argument is that 
conventional law relying on the concept of deterrence and punishment is simply 
irrelevant to combat “suicide missions” and given the modern weapons of mass 
destruction which are readily available to terrorist groups, even one slip-up can 
devastate a nation. Hence the need for preventive detention laws for national security. 
 
But is a preventive detention law such as the ISA the answer? The experience in 
Malaysia shows that if preventive detention law is a necessary evil, then in any event : 
(i) the specific law must be clearly defined and restricted in scope for the 
mischief it is to remedy;  
 
(ii) judicial detention is preferable to executive detention; 
(iii) the detainees should be represented by lawyers and have the right to apply 
to court and appear in court to challenge their detention; 
(iv) the detaining authority must clearly state the grounds of detention and the 
particulars for the purpose of satisfying the court the basis of the detention; 
(v) the test for detention should be the objective and not subjective test; 
(vi) there should be  a sunset clause in the enabling Act so that the statute 
would not be invoked and applied by the authorities even after the 
conditions that gave rise to it have ceased and abated. 
 
Therefore, even if a preventive detention law is found to be necessary in the context of 
extraordinary circumstances to protect democracy, given the fundamental safeguards 
necessary to prevent its abuse and misuse, the ISA should still be repealed. Given its 
history, it is beyond redemption.   
 
Conclusion 
At the core of public perception of the Rule of Law is a sense of justice  and fairness.  
Preventive  Detention  Laws  like  the  ISA,  by  their  very nature, challenge and 
undermine the essentials of a free and democratic society. The Executive would justify 
such laws as a necessity to defend freedom but the record of its use, rather misuse, in 
recent history betrays the fact that the so-called cure can be indistinguishable from the 
disease. 
 
           30.9.2002 
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declaration which is available  on  the web  (search :  Affidavit / Statutory Declaration 
of  Dr. Munawar Anees).  Parts of it read : 
 
“By the end of the second day the long hours of interrogation, the lack of sleep, and 
the lack of decent  food had left me completely disoriented and exhausted...Lying there 
curled up in that foetal position I could only replay in my mind what my captors had 
repeatedly drummed into me, the sex acts they asked me to act out, the vulnerable 
person I was in...One of the four screamed at me to stand up. I did so. All four came 
from behind the table and surrounded me in a very aggressive manner as if they were 
about to assault me. One of the mliterally had his face in mine. They all screamed at 
me, in my ears, loudly, again and again and again that I had (had sexual intercourse) 
with Anwar. They screamed and screamed and screamed, in my ears, at my face, at 
me, again and again, over and over asking me to say ‘yes’ until I gave in and broke 
down saying yes, yes. They stopped screaming. That was what they wanted to hear. 
They were not interested that it was untrue”.      
(Kua, K.S. : The I.S.A. As An Instrument of State Terror : Paper Presented at Forum 
on ISA on 25.10.2001). 
19Justice in Jeopardy : Malaysia 2000, Report by a mission comprising representatives 
of the International Bar Association, the Centre for the Independence of Judges and 
lawyers of the International Commission of Jurists, the Commonwealth Lawyers’ 
Associations and the union internationale des avocats; p.89 
20 Ibid. P.77. 
²¹ The New straits Times, 28.9.2002, p.1,4.  
      The Star, 28.9.2002, P.1,10.  
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